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Abstract
Evaluating agent performance when outcomes are stochas-
tic and agents use randomized strategies can be challeng-
ing when there is limited data available. The variance of
sampled outcomes may make the simple approach of Monte
Carlo sampling inadequate. This is the case for agents playing
heads-up no-limit Texas hold’em poker, where man-machine
competitions have involved multiple days of consistent play
and still not resulted in statistically significant conclusions
even when the winner’s margin is substantial. In this paper,
we introduce AIVAT, a low variance, provably unbiased value
assessment tool that uses an arbitrary heuristic estimate of
state value, as well as the explicit strategy of a subset of the
agents. Unlike existing techniques which reduce the variance
from chance events, or only consider game ending actions,
AIVAT reduces the variance both from choices by nature and
by players with a known strategy. The resulting estimator in
no-limit poker can reduce the number of hands needed to
draw statistical conclusions by more than a factor of 10.
Introduction
Evaluating an agent’s performance in stochastic settings can
be hard. Non-zero variance in outcomes means the game
must be played multiple times to compute a confidence in-
terval that likely contains the true expected value. Regard-
less of whether the variance arises from player actions or
from chance events, we might need to observe many sam-
ples before we get a narrow enough interval to draw desir-
able conclusions. In many situations, it is simply not feasible
(e.g., when the evaluation involves human participation) to
simply observe more samples, so we must turn to statistical
techniques that use additional information to help narrow the
confidence interval.
This agent evaluation problem is commonly encountered
in games, where the goal is to estimate the expected perfor-
mance difference between players. For example, consider
poker games. Poker is not only a long-standing challenge
problem for AI (von Neumann 1928; Koller and Pfeffer
1997; Billings et al. 2002) with annual competitions (Zinke-
vich and Littman 2006; Annual Computer Poker Compe-
tition ), but also a very popular game played by an esti-
mated 150 million players worldwide (Eco 2007). Heads-
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up no-limit Texas hold’em (HUNL) is a particular variant
of the game that has received considerable attention in the
AI community in recent years, including a “Brains vs. AI”
event pitting Claudico (Brains Vs. AI 2015), a top HUNL
computer program, against professional poker players. That
match involved 80,000 hands of poker, played over seven
days, involving four poker players, playing dozens of hours
each. Despite Claudico losing by over 9 big blinds per 100
hands (a margin that is considered huge by poker profession-
als) (Wood 2015), the result is only on the edge of statistical
significance, making it hard to draw a conclusion from this
large investment of human time.
Previous techniques for variance reduction to achieve
stronger statistical conclusions in this setting have used two
broad classes of statistical techniques. Techniques like MI-
VAT (White and Bowling 2009) use the method of control
variates with heuristic value estimates to reduce the vari-
ance caused by chance events. The technique of importance
sampling over imaginary observations (Bowling et al. 2008)
takes a different approach, using knowledge of a player strat-
egy to evaluate multiple states given a single observation.
Imaginary observations can be used to reduce the variance
caused by privately observed chance events, as well as the
player’s randomly chosen choice of whether to make any
actions which would immediately end the game.
Techniques from the two classes can be combined, but are
not specifically designed to work together for the greatest re-
duction in variance, and none of the techniques deal with the
variance caused by non-terminal action selection. Because
good play in imperfect information games generally requires
randomised action selection, ignoring action variance is an
important shortcoming. We introduce the action-informed
value assessment tool (AIVAT), an unbiased low-variance
estimator for imperfect information games which extends
the use of control variates to player actions, and makes ex-
plicit use of imaginary observations to exploit knowledge of
the game structure and player strategies.
Background
This paper focuses on variance reduction when evaluating
agents for extensive form games, a class of imperfect infor-
mation sequential decision making problems. Formally, an
extensive form game is a set of of players P and chance
player pc, a set of states S described as a history of actions
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from the initial state ∅, a set Z ⊂ S of terminal states, act-
ing player p(h) : S \ Z 7→ P ⋃{pc}, player value func-
tions vp(z) : Z 7→ R, and information partitions Ip of
{h ∈ S|p(h) = p}. We will say h @ h′ if a game in state h′
was previously in state h, h v h′ if h @ h′ or h = h′, A(h)
is the set of valid actions at h, and h · a is the successor state
of h that is reached by making action a. For all states h such
that p(h) = pc, σpc(h, a) is the publicly known probability
distribution over possible chance outcomes at state h.
An information set I ∈ Ip describes a set of states
that player p can not distinguish due to imperfect infor-
mation of the game state. Any player decision is therefore
made at information sets, not states. A behaviour strategy
σp(I, a) gives the probability of player p making decision
a at information set I . The behaviour in a state is deter-
mined by the information set I , so that ∀h ∈ I σp(h, a) =
σp(I, a). We will say the probability of reaching a state
h is pi(h) = Πh′·aσp(h′)(h′, a). It is also useful to con-
sider pip(h) = Πh′·avh,p(h′)=pσp(h′, a), the probability of
a player reaching state h if all other players play to reach h.
This notation can be extended so that for any set of players
T , piT (h) = Πp∈Tpip(h).
When talking about estimating the value for players in a
game, we are trying to find the expected value Ez[vp(z)] =∑
z∈Z pi(z)vp(z). An estimator e(z) is said to be unbiased if
the expected value Ez[e(z)] = Ez[vp(z)]. Having an estima-
tor be provably unbiased is important because it is in some
sense truthful: a player can not appear to do better by chang-
ing their play to take advantage of the estimation method.
MIVAT and Imaginary Observations
AIVAT is an extension of two earlier techniques, MIVAT
and importance sampling over imaginary observations. MI-
VAT (White and Bowling 2009) and its precursor DI-
VAT (Zinkevich et al. 2006) use value functions for a con-
trol variate that estimates the expected utility given observed
chance events. Conceptually, the techniques subtract the ex-
pected chance utility to get a lower variance value which
mostly depends on the player actions. For example, in poker,
it is likely that good hands end in positive outcomes and bad
hands end in negative outcomes. Starting with the observed
outcome, we could subtract some value for good hands and
add a value for bad hands, and we would expect the cor-
rected value to have lower variance. If the expected value of
the correction terms is zero, we can use the lower variance
corrected value as an unbiased estimator of player value.
DIVAT requires a strategy for all players to generate
value estimates for states through self-play, which MIVAT
generalised by allowing for arbitrary value functions de-
fined after chance events. MIVAT adds a correction term
for each chance event in an observed state. In order to re-
main unbiased despite using an arbitrary value estimation
function u(a), MIVAT uses a correction term of the form
Ea[u(a)] − u(o) for an observation with outcome o. Com-
puting this expectation requires us to know the probability
distribution that o was drawn from, which is true in the case
of chance events as σpc is public knowledge. These terms
are guaranteed to have an expected value of zero, making
the MIVAT value (observed value plus correction terms) an
unbiased estimate of player value. In a game like poker, MI-
VAT will account for the dealer giving a player favourable or
unfavourable cards, but not for lucky player actions selected
from a randomised strategy.
Imaginary observations with importance sampling (Bowl-
ing et al. 2008) use knowledge of a player’s strategy to com-
pute an expected value of multiple states given an observa-
tion of a single state. Due to imperfect information, there
may be many states which are all guaranteed to have the
same probability of the opponent making their actions. If
we consider importance sampling over these imaginary ob-
servations, the opponent’s probability of reaching the state
cancels out so we do not need the opponent’s strategy. By
taking an expectation over a set of states for every observa-
tion, we get a lower variance value.
There are two kinds of situations where we can use imag-
inary observations. First, for any states h where player p
could have made an action a which ends the game, we can
add the imaginary observation of the terminal state h ·a. For
example, in poker this lets us consider player p folding to a
bet they called or raised, or calling a bet we folded to in the
final round. Second, because of the information partitions in
imperfect information games, there may be other states that
have identical opponent probabilities. In poker, this lets us
consider all the states where the public player actions are
the same, the opponent private cards and public board cards
are the same, but player p has different private cards. Imag-
inary observations do not let us reduce the variance caused
by choosing non-terminal actions or the outcomes of pub-
licly visible chance events.
MIVAT and imaginary observations consider different in-
formation and can be combined to get a value estimate with
lower variance than either technique used individually. In-
stead of using the terminal value v(z) for an imaginary ob-
servation z, we could use the MIVAT value estimate given
z. However, because neither technique has terms which ad-
dress the effect of non-terminal actions, we would never ex-
pect this combination of techniques to produce a zero vari-
ance value estimate. Even with a “perfect” value function
that correctly estimates the expected value of a state and ac-
tion for the players, there would still be some variance in the
value estimate due to the random action selection by players.
AIVAT
Conceptually, AIVAT combines the chance correction terms
of MIVAT with imaginary observations across private in-
formation, along with new MIVAT-like correction terms for
player actions. The AIVAT estimator is the sum of a base
value using imaginary observations, plus imaginary obser-
vation correction terms for both player actions and chance
events. Roughly speaking, moving backwards through the
choices in an observed game, the AIVAT correction terms
are constructed in a fashion that shifts an estimate of the ex-
pected value after a choice was made towards an estimate of
the expected value before the choice.
Because imaginary observations with importance sam-
pling provides an unbiased estimate of the expected value
of the players, and the MIVAT-like terms have an expected
value of zero, AIVAT is also an unbiased estimator of the
expected player value. Furthermore, with well-structured
games, “perfect” value functions, and knowledge of all
player strategies, we could see zero variance: the imaginary
observation values and the correction terms would sum to
the expected player value, regardless of the observed game.
Figure 1 gives a high level overview of MIVAT, imaginary
observations, and AIVAT. In this example, we are interested
in the expected value for player 1, and know player 1’s strat-
egy. We use an observation of one hand of Leduc hold’em
poker, a small synthetic game constructed for artificial intel-
ligence research (Southey et al. 2005). Leduc hold’em is a
two round game with one private card for each player, and
one publicly visible board card that is revealed after the first
round of player actions. In the example, player 1 is dealt Q♠
and player 2 is dealt K♠. Player 1 makes the check action
followed by a player 2 check action. The public board card is
revealed to be J♥. After the round two actions check, raise,
call, player 1 loses 5 chips.
  
chance
P1 Q♠
chance
P2 K♠
chance
public J♡
P1
check
P2
check
P1
check
P2
bet 4
P1
call
-5 chips
E[u(c)]
-u(Q♠)
E[u(c)]
-u(K♠)
E[u(hand,a)]
-E[u(hand,check)]
E[u(hand,a)]
-E[u(hand,check)]
E[u(hand,a)]
-E[u(hand,call)]
-5 chips
E[u(c)]
-u(J♡)
MIVAT
E[u(hand,c)]
-E[u(hand,K♠)]
E[u(hand,c)]
-E[u(hand,J♡)]
Imaginary
Observations AIVAT
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
E[v(hand)] E[v(hand)]
+
Figure 1: Comparison of MIVAT, imaginary observations,
and AIVAT
AIVAT Correction Terms
We start by describing the correction terms added for chance
events and actions. Given information about a player’s strat-
egy, we can treat that player’s choice events as chance events
and construct MIVAT-like correction terms for them. The
player strategy also allows imaginary observations consid-
ering alternative histories with identical opponent probabili-
ties, so we can compute an expectation over a set of compat-
ible histories rather than using the single observed outcome.
The correction term at a decision point will be the expec-
tation across all compatible histories of the expected value
before a choice, minus the value after the observed choice.
As with MIVAT, the values are estimated using an arbitrary
fixed value function to estimate the value after every deci-
sion. Value estimates which more closely approximate the
true expected value will result in greater variance reduction.
To consider imaginary observations, we need at least one
player for which we know the know the strategy. Let Pa be
a non-empty set of players, including pc, such that ∀p ∈ Pa
we know σp, and Po = P \Pa be the set of opponent players
for which we do not know the strategy. If Pa = {pc} then
AIVAT would be identical to MIVAT. We must also parti-
tion the states into the sets we can evaluate given an obser-
vation of a completed game. Let H be a partition of states
{h|p(h) ∈ Pa} such that ∀H ∈ H and ∀h, h′ ∈ H ,
1. ∀p ∈ Po ∀σp pip(h) = pip(h′). For example, this can be
enforced by requiring h and h′ to pass through the same
sequence of player p information sets and make the same
actions at those information sets.
2. h 6@ h′. This implies a uniqueness property, where for
any terminal z, {h′′|h′′ @ z, h′′ ∈ H} is either empty or
a singleton.
3. We will extend the actions so thatA′(h) =
⋃
h′′∈H A(h
′′)
and let σ(h, a) = 0 ∀a ∈ A′(h)\A(h). Because A′(h) =
A′(h′) we will say A(H) = A′(h).
Similar to MIVAT, we need value functions that give an
estimate of the expected value after an action. Let there be
arbitrary functions uh(a) : A′(h) 7→ R for each state h
where p(h) ∈ Pa. Say we have seen a terminal state z. Con-
sider a part H ∈ H. If @h ∈ H such that h @ z, then
the correction term kH(z) = 0. Otherwise, property 2 of
H implies there is a unique observed action aO such that
h · aO v z, h ∈ H, aO ∈ A(h), and the correction term is
kH(z) =
∑
a∈A(H)
∑
h∈H piPa(h · a)uh(a)∑
h∈H piPa(h)
−
∑
h∈H piPa(h · aO)uh(aO)∑
h∈H piPa(h · aO)
AIVAT uses the sum of kH(z) across all H ∈ H.
AIVAT Base Value
The AIVAT correction terms have an expected value of zero,
and are not a value estimate by themselves. They must be
combined with an unbiased estimate of player value. For im-
proved variance reduction, the form of the correction terms
must match the choice of base value estimate.
To see how the terms match, consider a simplified ver-
sion of AIVAT where the final correction term for a terminal
state h ·o has the form Ea[uh(a)]−uh(o). Ideally, we would
like the value estimate for h · a to be uh(a). The value esti-
mate plus the correction term will then have the same value
Ea[uh(a)] for all actions at h, resulting in zero variance.
For the AIVAT correction terms, the correct choice is to
use imaginary observations of all possible private informa-
tion for players in Pa, as in “Example 3: Private Informa-
tion” of the paper by Bowling et al. (Bowling et al. 2008).
In poker, it corresponds to evaluating the game with all pos-
sible private cards, weighted by the likelihood of holding
the cards given the observed game. For completeness, we
formally describe the particular instance of this existing es-
timator using the notation of this paper.
Given the correction term partitionH of player Pa states,
we construct a matching partitionW of terminal states such
that ∀W ∈ W and ∀z, z′ ∈W ,
• ∀p ∈ Po ∀σp pip(z) = pip(z′).
• a player in Pa made an action in z ⇐⇒ a player in Pa
made an action in z′.
• if a player in Pa made an action in z, then for the longest
prefix h @ z and h′ @ z′ such that p(h) ∈ Pa and p(h′) ∈
Pa, both h and h′ are in the same part ofH.
The last two conditions onW ensure that the imaginary ob-
servation estimate does not include terminal states that the
correction terms will also account for. This rules out a form
of double counting which would not produce a biased es-
timator, but would increase the variance when using high
quality estimates in the correction terms.
If we observe a terminal state z, let W ∈ W be the part
such that z ∈W . The base estimated value for player p is∑
z′∈W piPa(z
′)vp(z′)∑
z′∈W piPa(z′)
AIVAT Value Estimate
The AIVAT estimator gives an unbiased estimate of the ex-
pected value Ez[vp(z)]. If we use partitions H and W as
described above, and are given an observation of a terminal
state z ∈W ∈ W , the value estimate is
AIVAT(z) =
∑
z′∈W piPa(z
′)vp(z′)∑
z′∈W piPa(z′)
+
∑
H∈H
kH(z) (1)
Note that there is a subtle difference between AIVAT and
a simple combination of imaginary observations and an ex-
tended MIVAT framework using player strategy information
to add control variates for actions. Using an extended MI-
VAT plus imaginary observations, we would consider the
expected MIVAT value estimate across all terminal histories
compatible with the observed terminal state. In AIVAT, for
each correction term we would consider all histories com-
patible with the state at that decision point.
As a concrete example of the difference, consider the
game used in Figure 1. MIVAT with imaginary observations
would only consider private cards for player 1 that do not
conflict with the opponent’s K♠ or the public card J♥, even
when computing the E[u(c)] − u(J♥) control variate term
for the public card. In contrast, AIVAT considers J♥ as a
possible player card for the term.
Unbiased Value Estimate
It is desirable to have an unbiased value estimate for games,
so that players can not improve their estimated value by
changing their strategy to fit the estimation technique. We
prove that AIVAT is unbiased. The value estimate AIVAT(z)
in Equation 1 is a sum of two parts. The fraction in the first
part is an unbiased estimator based on imaginary observa-
tions (Bowling et al. 2008), so we only need to show that
the sum of all kH terms has an expected value of 0.
Lemma 1 ∀H ∈ H Ez∈Z [kH(z)] = 0
Proof. Consider an arbitrary H ∈ H. Let Z(H) = {z ∈
Z|∃h ∈ H,h @ z} be the set of terminal states passing
through H . Expanding definitions, using property 1 of H
and multiplying by piPo(H)/piPo(H) = 1 we get
E
z∈Z
[kH(z)] =
∑
z∈Z
pi(z)kH(z) =
∑
z∈Z(H)
pi(z)kH(z)
=
∑
z∈Z(H)
pi(z)
piPo(H)
piPo(H)
∑
a∈A(H)
∑
h∈H piPa(h · a)uh(a)∑
h∈H piPa(h)
−
∑
z∈Z(H)
pi(z)
piPo(H)
piPo(H)
∑
h∈H piPa(h · aO)uh(aO)∑
h∈H piPa(h · aO)
Using piPo(h)piPa(h) = pi(h)
=
∑
z∈Z(H)
pi(z)
∑
a∈A(H)
∑
h∈H pi(h · a)uh(a)∑
h∈H pi(h)
−
∑
z∈Z(H)
pi(z)
∑
h∈H pi(h · aO)uh(aO)∑
h∈H pi(h · aO)
Using
∑
z,h@z pi(z) = pi(h) and
∑
z,h·a@z pi(z) = pi(h · a)
=
∑
h′∈H
pi(h′)
∑
a∈A(H)
∑
h∈H pi(h · a)uh(a)∑
h∈H pi(h)
−
∑
h′∈H
∑
a∈A(h′)
pi(h′ · a)
∑
h∈H pi(h · a)uh(a)∑
h∈H pi(h · a)
Using property 3 ofH
=
∑
h′∈H
pi(h′)
∑
a∈A(H)
∑
h∈H pi(h · a)uh(a)∑
h∈H pi(h)
−
∑
a∈A(H)
∑
h′∈H
pi(h′ · a)
∑
h∈H pi(h · a)uh(a)∑
h∈H pi(h · a)
=
∑
a∈A(H)
∑
h∈H
pi(h · a)uh(a)−
∑
a∈A(H)
∑
h∈H
pi(h · a)uh(a)
= 0
Because the expected value is 0 for an arbitrary H , the ex-
pected value is 0 for the sum of all H ∈ H.
Theorem 1 Ez∈Z [
∑
H∈H kH(z)] = 0
Proof. This immediately follows from Lemma 1, as the ex-
pected value of a sum of terms is the sum of the expected
values of the terms, which are all 0.
Experimental Results
We demonstrate the effectiveness of AIVAT in two poker
games, Leduc hold’em and heads-up no-limit Texas hold’em
(HUNL). Both Leduc hold’em and HUNL have a convenient
structure where all actions are public, and there is a mix of
chance events in the form of completely public board cards
and completely private hole cards. The uncomplicated struc-
ture leads to a clear choice for the partitionH. Each H ∈ H
has states with identical betting, public board cards, and pri-
vate hole cards for any players in Po.
In all experiments the value functions uh(a) are self-play
values, generated by solving the game to find a Nash equi-
librium strategy using a variant of the Monte Carlo CFR al-
gorithm (Lanctot et al. 2009). For each player px and par-
tition H , we save the average observed values for oppo-
nent py across all iterations, giving us a value wH(a) ≈∑
h∈H pipx(h · a)E[vpy (h)]/
∑
h∈H pipx(h · a). wH(a) is
an expected self-play value for py at H , given the proba-
bility distribution of hands for px that reach H and play a.
Because we are playing a zero-sum game and vpx(h) =−vpy (h), we can use uh(a) = −wH(a) ∀h ∈ H . In
HUNL, which is too large to solve directly, we solve a
very small abstraction of the game (Billings et al. 2003;
Ganzfried and Sandholm 2014) with only 8 million infor-
mation sets, which gives us a rough estimate of wH(a) that
is identical across many partitions of HUNL states.
Poker is played in an alternating fashion, where agents
take turns playing in different positions. Let us say we have
two agents, x and y. In poker, in odd-numbered games (start-
ing at game 1) we would have x as player 1 and y as player
2, and in even-numbered games we would have y as player 1
and x as player 2. For the experiments, we model this as an
extended game where there is an initial 50/50 chance event
that assigns a position to the agent, along with a AIVAT cor-
rection term for the position.
All experiments will compare AIVAT value estimates
with the unmodified game values from counting chips, the
MIVAT value estimate, and the combination of MIVAT
and imaginary observations using the strategy for agent x
(MIVAT+IOx). Because poker is a zero-sum game, it is suf-
ficient to present results from the point of view of agent x.
Leduc Hold’em
The small size of Leduc hold’em lets us test both the case
where Pa only contains one non-chance player, as well as
the full-knowledge case where Pa = P . AIVAT and chip
count results are generated from observations of 100,000
games. All of the numbers are in units of chips, where Leduc
hold’em has a 1 chip ante, and 2 chip and 4 chip bets in the
first and second rounds, respectively.
Figure 2 looks at self-play, where both x and y play the
same Nash equilibrium that was used to generate uh(a). The
true expected value for player x is 0. Because we are using
value functions computed from their self-play, this exper-
iment represents a best-case situation. With knowledge of
both player’s strategies, the only remaining variance comes
from noise in the uh(a) value function that arises from the
sampling and averaging used in the MCCFR computation.
With knowledge of both player’s strategies, we reduce the
per-game standard deviation of the estimated player value
by a little less than 99.9%. This situation might be unlikely
in practice, but does demonstrate that the AIVAT computa-
tion correctly shifts every observed outcome to the expected
player value, given full correct information. Surprisingly, the
one-sided evaluation where we use only one player’s strat-
Estimator v¯x SD(vx)
chips 0.01374 3.513
MIVAT 0.00448 2.327
MIVAT+IOx 0.00987 1.928
Pa = {pc, x} -0.00009 0.00643
Pa = {pc, x, y} -0.00001 0.00377
Figure 2: Value estimates for self-play in Leduc hold’em
egy still reduces the standard deviation by 99.8%. Using MI-
VAT or MIVAT+IOx, we only see a 33.8% and 45.1% reduc-
tion, respectively.
Moving away from the best-case situation, Figure 3 looks
at games where x is the same Nash equilibrium from above,
and y is an agent that randomly calls or raises. Given these
strategies, the true expected value for player x is 0.69358.
Estimator v¯x SD(vx)
chips 0.71673 5.761
MIVAT 0.68932 4.412
MIVAT+IOx 0.69968 4.295
Pa = {pc, x} 0.69050 1.437
Pa = {pc, x, y} 0.68698 1.782
Pa = {pc, y} 0.69614 2.983
Figure 3: Value estimates for dissimilar strategies in Leduc
hold’em
Using the call/raise strategy for y demonstrates that the
amount of variance reduction does depend on how well the
value functions estimates the true expected value of a situa-
tion. We used value functions which encode self-play values
for x, and while y is sufficiently similar to x that the true
values are still positively correlated with the estimated val-
ues for both players, they are no longer an almost-perfect
match. Despite the strategic mismatch, using AIVAT we see
a reduction in the standard deviation of 48% to 75% com-
pared to the basic chip-count estimate. All of the AIVAT es-
timators outperform the 25% reduction using MIVAT plus
imaginary observations.
No-limit Texas Hold’em
The game of HUNL better represents a potential real-world
application. The game is commonly played, it is too large
to easily compute exact expected values directly even when
the strategy of both agents is known, average win rate is a
statistic of interest to players and observers, and the high
per-game variance of outcomes obscures the win rate even
after hundreds of thousands of hands.
The variant of HUNL that we use has a small blind of 1
chip and big blind of 2 chips, and each player has 200 chips
(i.e., 100 big blinds.) Due to the large branching factor of
chance events, we can only present results for AIVAT analy-
sis using the strategy of one agent. All results are generated
from observations of 1 million games.
We start by looking at self-play, using a low-quality Nash
equilibrium approximation for both players x and y. The
value functions uh(a) are generated using this same weak
approximation. Figure 4 gives the results for the different
estimation methods. The true expected value for x is 0.
Estimator v¯x SD(vx)
chips 0.03871 25.962
MIVAT 0.02038 21.293
MIVAT+IOx 0.02596 16.073
Pa = {pc, x} 0.00186 8.095
Figure 4: Value estimates for self-play in HUNL
In Figure 5 we look at games where x uses the same
low-quality approximation of a Nash equilibrium, and y is
a much stronger agent using a high-quality approximation
of a Nash equilibrium. The value functions uh(a) are still
generated using the low-quality approximation. The true ex-
pected value for player x is not known.
Estimator v¯x SD(vx)
chips -0.10017 26.308
MIVAT -0.11565 21.546
MIVAT+IOx -0.11297 16.051
Pa = {pc, x} -0.10971 8.301
Figure 5: Value estimates for dissimilar strategies in HUNL
In both experiments, we see a 39% reduction in the stan-
dard deviation when using MIVAT with imaginary observa-
tions, and a bit more than a 68% reduction using AIVAT. It
must be noted that our value function could be improved,
as the 18% reduction for MIVAT in this experiment does
not match the 23% improvement previously demonstrated
using values learned from data (White and Bowling 2009).
The small abstract game used to generate the value functions
does not do a good job of understanding the consequences
of cards being dealt, as it can not distinguish most card situ-
ations. Despite this handicap, the full AIVAT estimator still
significantly improves on the state of the art for low-variance
value estimators for imperfect information games.
Conclusions
We introduce a technique for value estimation in imperfect
information games that extends and combines existing tech-
niques. AIVAT uses heuristic value functions, knowledge
of game structure, and knowledge about player strategies
to both add a control variate term for chance and player
decisions, and to average over multiple possible outcomes
given a single observation. We prove AIVAT is unbiased,
and demonstrate that with (almost) perfect value functions
we see (almost) complete elimination of variance. Even with
imprecise value functions, we show variance reduction in
a real-world game that significantly exceeds existing tech-
niques. AIVAT’s three times reduction in standard deviation
allows us to achieve the same statistical significance with ten
times less data. A factor of ten is substantial: for problems
with limited data, like human play against bots, ten times as
many games could be the distinction between practical and
impractical.
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